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BASEL RISK WEIGHTS, 
ASSET CORRELATIONS 
AND BOOK-TO-MARKET 
EQUITY: Evidence from 
Asian Countries
Based on the Basel II Accord ﬁnalised by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS 
2006), asset correlation is a key parameter used in the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach 
to determine the minimum capital requirements for credit risk. Asset correlation measures the 
correlation between an obligor’s asset returns and the common risk factor that reﬂects general 
economic conditions. A higher value indicates higher systematic risk which requires a bank to 
keep more capital, ceteris paribus. The BCBS (2006) approach estimates asset correlations as a 
positive function of ﬁrm size, and a negative function of ﬁrm default probability after adjustment 
for obligor type. 
In this paper, we extend the study of Lee and Lin (2012) and Lee et al. (2013) by examining 
whether book-to-market equity values (BE/ME) affect the asset correlations of ﬁrms in China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. We choose these countries as Australian-
owned banks (especially the big four banks) have signiﬁcantly increased their activity in Asia 
and these countries include both the second largest economy in the world and most developed 
economies in Asia. Our ﬁnding that obligors with higher (lower) BE/ME are related to lower 
(higher) asset correlation has important implications for the Basel capital requirements. First, 
BE/ME can improve the calibration of asset correlations that are initially determined by the 
common risk factor (i.e. the market factor), yielding a more accurate estimate of a bank’s 
capital requirements. Incorporating BE/ME into Basel’s Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) 
framework may capture any additional systematic risk of an obligor that is currently missing in 
borrower types, default probability and ﬁrm size. Second, incorporating BE/ME as a systematic 
risk factor in estimates of asset correlations can also serve as an automatic mechanism to smooth 
the cyclical impact of the business cycle. As BE/ME tends to decrease during economic upturns, 
banks will be required to hold a higher capital requirement due to increasing asset correlations, 
potentially reducing their lending activities during good times. Failure to incorporate BE/ME into 
estimates of asset correlations may lead to inadequate speciﬁcation in the IRB framework and to 
potential regulatory arbitrage by banks.2
We examine the effect of ﬁrm book-to-market equity values (BE/ME) on asset 
correlations which play an important role in determining risk weights under the 
current Basel capital requirements. Using ﬁrms in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan over a sample period from 1988 to 2013, we ﬁnd that BE/
ME has a negative effect on asset correlations. This suggests a role for BE/ME as 
an additional factor in determining asset correlations, and thus risk weights, also 
potentially reducing incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage.1
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The importance of BE/ME as another dimension of systematic risk for pricing equity has been 
documented by Fama and French (1992, 1993, and 1995) in the asset pricing literature. Indeed, 
BE/ME can be seen as an important proxy for systematic risk in estimating risk-adjusted returns. 
It follows that if BE/ME is a source of systematic risk on equity, it is also likely to be a source of 
systematic risk on assets. 
A potential source of BE/ME on an obligor’s systematic risk can be traced to its operating 
leverage, just as default probability is linked to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage. Carlson et al. (2004) 
and Cooper (2006) show that high BE/ME ﬁrms, with more assets in place than growth 
options, tend to carry higher ﬁxed assets relative to total ﬁrm value. If ﬁxed production costs 
are proportional to irreversible capital invested, high BE/ME ﬁrms tend to have high operating 
leverage that leads to greater systematic risk. However, assuming production costs are variable, 
ﬁrms have options to lower costs by reducing capacity utilisation in response to falling demand. 
Aguerrevere (2009) shows that ﬁrms with high BE/ME may exhibit lower operating leverage, 
implying that BE/ME is negatively related to operating leverage. The aforementioned research 
indicates a potential linkage between BE/ME and operating leverage. 
Our analysis yields the following results which improve the calibration of asset correlations 
and have important implications for the Basel capital requirements. First, after controlling for 
ﬁrm size, default probability and industry effects, ﬁrms with higher BE/ME are associated with 
lower asset correlations. This suggests a role for BE/ME as an additional conditional variable 
on asset correlations and risk weights. Second, asset correlations vary positively with ﬁrm size 
and negatively with ﬁrm default probability, as with the assumptions in the Basel approach. Our 
results are consistent with Lopez (2004) and Lee et al. (2011) but different from Dietsch and 
Petey (2004) and Lee et al. (2009) who report that asset correlations are higher on average for 
ﬁrms with higher default probability. Our evidence therefore supports the speciﬁcations of asset 
correlations in the ASRF approach in relation to ﬁrm size and default probability. 
Our analysis yields the following results which improve the calibration of asset 
correlations and have important implications for the Basel capital requirements. First, 
after controlling for ﬁrm size, default probability and industry effects, ﬁrms with higher 
BE/ME are associated with lower asset correlations. This suggests a role for BE/ME as 
an additional conditional variable on asset correlations and risk weights. Second, asset 
correlations vary positively with ﬁrm size and negatively with ﬁrm default probability, as 
with the assumptions in the Basel approach.
Data and calibration methodology
Data for our sample ﬁrms in China (10,459 ﬁrm years), Hong Kong (10,337 ﬁrm years), Japan 
(16,596 ﬁrm years), Korea (8,993 ﬁrm years), Singapore (4,823 ﬁrm years) and Taiwan (7,477 ﬁrm 
years) are obtained from Datastream for the period from 1988 to 2013. All ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms 
are excluded from the sample. We choose these sample countries because Australian-owned 
banks have signiﬁcantly increased their activity in Asia to facilitate the large and growing trade 
and investment ﬂows between Australia and this region. 
According to the consolidated data in the International Banking Statistics (RBA 2013), 
the aggregate claims/exposures of all Australian-owned banks in Asia increased to $112 billion 
in December 2012, from $27 billion ﬁve years earlier. More speciﬁcally, the strong growth in 
Australian banks’ Asian exposure focuses on four economies: China, Hong Kong, Japan and 
Singapore. We add Korea and Taiwan into our sample countries since they are another two 
important developed economies in Asia. We believe Australian bank activity in this region will 
expand over the longer term as trade and investment between Australia and Asia continues to 
grow. Since our research enhances the estimation of asset correlation and relates to credit risk of 
companies in these countries, the results should be of interest to Australian banks and investors. 
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To have sufficient observations to calculate the standard deviation of equity returns  E  and 
equity beta E , we exclude ﬁrms with daily returns of less than 100 observations in each year. 
To calculate the standard deviation of asset returns, we also require ﬁrms to have ﬁve consecutive 
years of annual asset values. As our goal is to help banks assess possible credit losses, ﬁrms 
without debt are not relevant and are excluded from our sample. We estimate the asset 
correlation for each sample ﬁrm yearly using a ﬁnal data sample which includes 58,685 ﬁrm-year 
observations, covering ﬁrms in 10 industrial sectors over a 26-year period. Speciﬁcally, we follow 
Lee et al. (2011) to estimate the correlation between the market rate of return and the implied rate 
of return on the ﬁrm’s assets, using an approach derived from Merton (1974) and described in the 
Appendix. The summary statistics of relevant variables are presented in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Summary statistics of the sample ﬁrms
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Market value of assets ($millions) 1,118.13 3,003.24 10.90 97.69 257.15 740.74 59,656.46
Market value of equity ($millions) 533.82 1,374.90 5.17 43.85 125.60 382.55 15,658.69
Total liabilities ($millions) 595.25 2,007.58 1.34 35.84 102.20 331.9 47,387.08
Sales ($millions) 803.56 2,019.83 1.27 67.92 180.52 537.20 20,329.89
Sigmae 0.4609 0.2235 0.0090 0.3108 0.4187 0.5625 4.8089
Sigmaa 0.2507 0.1769 0.0020 0.1323 0.2134 0.3223 4.7907
Book-to-market equity 1.1760 0.8884 0.2000 0.5261 0.9110 1.5453 4.9983
Default probability 0.0188 0.0584 0.0000 1.48E-07 2.22E-04 0.0083 0.9794
Asset correlations 0.1999 0.1752 7.37E-10 0.0488 0.1580 0.3145 0.9292
Note: This table presents the average values of market value of assets, market value of equity, total liabilities, sales, 
volatility of equity returns, volatility of asset returns, book-to-market, default probability, and asset correlations of 
sample ﬁrms from 1988 to 2013. All amounts are in US dollars.
Empirical results
Basel II assigns different weights for borrower types to estimate asset correlations. For instance, 
the asset correlation estimation for corporations (BCBS 2006) is:
 PD( ) = 0.12 1 e
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where PD  is the probability of default. According to Equation 1, the regulatory asset correlation 
of regular ﬁrms ranges from 0.12 to 0.24 and there is a negative relationship between asset 
correlation and default probability. As shown in Table 1, our calibrated average asset correlation 
for all samples is 0.199, which is within the speciﬁed range of regulatory asset correlations. 
We perform the following regression analysis to investigate whether BE/ME captures additional 
variations in asset correlations,
ACi ,t = +b1 ln(BEi ,t / MEi ,t )+b2PDi ,t +b3LnSalesi ,t +  jDI j + kDYk
k=1
22
 + lDCl
l=1
5
 +
j=1
9
 i ,t  (2)
where ACi,t  is the asset correlation for i  ﬁrm at time t ; ln(BEi,t /MEi,t )  is the natural log of book 
equity to market equity; PDi,t  is the default probability; LnSalei,t  is the natural log of ﬁrm sales, as 
the proxy for ﬁrm size; DI j  is the industry dummy for industry j ; DYk  is the dummy variable for 
year k ; DCl  is the dummy variable for country l  and i,t  is the error term. For a robustness check 
on the regression results, we also apply the inverse logistic function, ILnAC = Ln AC 1 AC( )( ) , 
to transform the asset correlation such that the dependent variable can vary beyond the 
restricted range of 0 to 1. 
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Table 2 presents the regression result. Model 1 in Panel A shows that BE/ME alone is signiﬁcantly 
and negatively related to average asset correlations. Firms with higher BE/ME are associated 
with lower asset correlations. Adding ﬁrm default probability and ﬁrm size along with BE/ME in 
models 2 and 3 has little impact. BE/ME continues to explain average asset correlations that ﬁrm 
default probability and ﬁrm size fail to account for. 
To check whether BE/ME is a proxy for industry effect, we add industry dummies as shown in 
model 5. Again, the signiﬁcance of BE/ME effect is unaffected. These results are also robust to 
the inverse logistic function of asset correlations, ILnAC = Ln AC 1 AC( )( ) , reported in Panel B. 
Consistent with Lee and Lin (2012), the results indicate that incorporating BE/ME as an additional 
explanator of asset correlations may improve estimation for asset correlations of ﬁrms. 
Results in Table 2 also suggest that incorporating ﬁrm size does not alter the effect of ﬁrm default 
probability on asset correlations as the coefficient of ﬁrm default probability in model 4 is largely 
insensitive to the presence of ﬁrm size. This conﬁrms that the impact of ﬁrm default probability 
and ﬁrm size on asset correlations is consistent with the speciﬁcations in the ASRF framework. 
TABLE 2: Regression results of book-to-market equity, default probability, and size
Panel A: Dependent variable-AC
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  
Intercept 0.390 *** 0.382 *** 0.198 *** 0.198 *** 0.208 ***
 (16.65)  (16.39)  (8.86)  (8.86)  (9.27)  
BE/ME -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.014 *** -0.012 *** -0.013 ***
(-18.38) (-15.58) (-19.82) (-17.84) (-19.15)
PD  -0.259 ***  -0.167 *** -0.175 ***
(-24.96) (-16.87) (-17.76)
Ln(Sales)   0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.028 ***
     (81.07)  (78.74)  (76.21)  
Industry dummy Yes
Year and country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.34  0.35  0.41  0.41  0.42  
Panel B: Dependent variable-Iln(AC)
Intercept -0.583 * -0.696 ** -2.733 *** -2.741 *** -2.724 ***
 (-1.97)  (-2.37)  (-9.57)  (-9.63)  (-9.50)  
BE/ME -0.110 *** -0.082 *** -0.114 *** -0.093 *** -0.101 ***
(-12.11) (-9.00) (-13.01) (-10.61) (-11.40)
PD  -3.652 ***  -2.642 *** -2.721 ***
(-27.95) (-20.86) (-21.58)
Ln(Sales)   0.332 *** 0.320 *** 0.315 ***
     (71.00)  (68.33)  (66.42)  
Industry dummy Yes
Year and country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.22  0.23  0.28  0.28  0.29  
N 58,685 58,685 58,685 58,685 58,685
Note: This table presents the regression results of asset correlation on book-to-market equity, default probability, 
and ﬁrm size from 1988 to 2013. BE/ME is the natural log of book-to-market equity. PD is default probability. 
Ln(Sales), a proxy for ﬁrm size, is the natural log of sales. t-statistic is reported in parentheses.  
** denotes statistical signiﬁcant at 1 per cent level. 
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Conclusions
In the spirit of continuing improvements to the ASRF framework, we examine whether asset 
correlation is related to a ﬁrm’s book-to-market equity value (BE/ME). We ﬁnd that BE/ME, as 
a systematic risk related to a ﬁrm’s operating leverage, captures variations in asset correlations. 
Our results have important implications for the Basel capital requirement. First, calibrating 
average asset correlations in the current Basel’s ASRF framework for BE/ME may yield a more 
accurate estimate of asset correlations and thereby an improvement in bank regulatory capital 
adequacy requirements. More speciﬁcally, banks with obligors having a lower BE/ME should hold 
higher capital as they potentially exhibit higher systematic risk. In addition to different weights 
for obligors’ size and default probability, different weights on asset correlations should also be 
imposed based on obligors’ BE/ME. This approach can potentially reduce banks’ incentives to 
engage in this aspect of regulatory capital arbitrage.
Second, incorporating BE/ME as a systematic risk factor in estimates of asset correlations can 
reduce the procyclical impact of capital requirement, one of the major regulatory issues in 
Basel III. As BE/ME tends to decrease during economic upturns, asset correlation will become 
higher, leading to a higher capital requirement. This automatic mechanism helps to smooth the 
cyclical impact of the business cycle as banks’ lending activities will decrease due to a higher 
capital requirement. Finally, consistent with the current speciﬁcation, our results also conﬁrm that 
asset correlations are positively related to ﬁrm size and negatively related to default probability. 
Notes
1.  We would like to thank Kevin Davis and the anonymous referee for providing valuable comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. All errors are our own.
2.  Regulatory arbitrage may occur as the risk of assets is not priced properly, thus providing incentives for 
banks to engage in more risky lending or hold more risky assets without the requirement for additional capital. 
For example, banks may generate more risky loans by obligors with a lower BE/ME relative to those with a higher 
BE/ME under current Basel capital requirement, which fails to consider BE/ME a systematic risk factor.
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APPENDIX
We follow Lee et al. (2011) to estimate asset correlation as follows: 
 = EE(t) M
V (t) V  N (d1 (t,T ))






2
, (A1)
where V(t) is the value of a ﬁrm’s asset and E(t) is ﬁrm’s equity. N()  is the cumulative normal 
density function; d1(t,T ) = d2 (t,T )V (t,T )  
where 
d2 (t,T ) =
ln(B(t)
V (t)
)+ 1
2
V
2 (t,T )
V (t,T )
 and V2 (t,T ) =V2 (T  t) . E  is the equity beta and M  
is the standard deviation of the market returns.
Equation A1 shows that   can be estimated using well-known variables. However, since asset 
value and the standard deviation of the asset value are not observable, we need to estimate 
them before computing  . According to Merton (1974), a ﬁrm’s equity, E(t), can be viewed as a 
European call option,
E(t) =V (t)N (d1 (t,T )) B(t)N (d2 (t,T )), (A2)
Applying Ito’s Lemma,
 E =
V (t)
E(t)
N (d1 (t,T ))V , (A3)
Equation A3 relates the standard deviation of equity returns,  E , to that of total asset returns, 
V . Together with Equation A2, we can solve the market value of total assets, V (t) , and its 
standard deviation, V . From Equation A2, N d2( )  is referred to the default probability of a ﬁrm. 
However, its measure relies on the risk-neutral assumption. To relax the assumption, we replace 
the risk-free interest rate with the instantaneous expected return on a ﬁrm's assets (μA ) before 
calculating the default probabilities under an objective probability measure. We follow Lee et al. 
(2011) who use an option-based method to estimate μA .
